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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
All parties to the proceedings below are identified in the caption on appeal. The trial 
Court signed an order of dismissal on July 11, 1995, dismissing defendant Red's Lounge from 
this case. (R. 179-181) Plaintiff/appellant has not appealed that ruling. 
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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2-(3)(j), as 
amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to this Court for review: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the district court correctly determined that USPCI did not 
have any duty to restrain David W. Martinez, or otherwise prevent him from leaving USPCI's 
premises. 
This issue was raised in USPCI's motion for summary judgment and supporting 
memoranda (R. 190-99), and McNicol's memorandum in opposition to the motion (R. 200-
06). 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: The district court's order granting 
summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc.. 901 P.2d 
1013, 1014 (Utah 1995). 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the district court correctly determined that USPCI did not 
breach any duty to restrain David W. Martinez, or otherwise prevent him from leaving 
USPCI's premises. 
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This issue was raised in defendant's motion for summary judgment and supporting 
memoranda (R. 190-99), and plaintiff s memorandum in opposition to the motion (R. 200-06). 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: The district court's order granting 
summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d 
1013, 1014 (Utah 1995). 
ISSUE NO, 3: Whether USPCI was entitled to summary judgment on the basis that 
any alleged act or omission of USPCI was not the proximate cause of the accident. 
This issue was raised by inference in defendant's motion for summary judgment and 
supporting memoranda (R. 190-99), plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to the motion (R. 
200-06), and defendant's reply to plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to the motion (R. 
207-210). This issue was also raised at oral arguments, although those arguments were not 
transcribed. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: Although the district court did not 
specifically rule on this issue, this Court may affirm summary judgment upon any ground 
raised below. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1012 n. 22 (Utah 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a personal injury and wrongful death action. The plaintiff/appellant Betty 
McNicol ("Mrs. McNicor or "plaintiff) was injured and her husband, James McNicol, ("Mr. 
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McNicol") was killed in an automobile accident involving automobiles driven by Mr. McNicol 
and David Martinez ("Mr. Martinez"). (R. 1-4). On August 16, 1994, Mrs. McNicol brought 
suit against USPCI for failure to prevent Mr. Martinez from leaving USPCI's premises. (R. 
1-4). 
Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff filed a complaint on or about August 16, 1994, against defendants USPCI and 
Red's Lounge. (R. 1-4). Plaintiff stipulated to an order dismissing defendant Red's Lounge 
from the lawsuit and the trial court signed the order on July 11, 1995. (R. 179-81). 
Defendant USPCI moved for summary judgment on October 16, 1995. (R. 190-91). Oral 
argument was heard by the trial court on December 11, 1995. (R. 220). The trial court 
granted defendant USPCI's motion on March 6, 1996. (R. 223). Plaintiff took this appeal 
on May 1, 1996, from the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant USPCI. (R. 
230-31, 234-35). 
Disposition at Trial Court 
The trial court granted USPCI's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
USPCI did not have and did not breach any duty to restrain, prevent, retain or otherwise 
control the conduct of Mr. Martinez. (R. 230-31; Appendix A). 
Statement of the Facts Relevant 
to the Issues Presented for Review 
Viewing the evidence most favorably to plaintiffs claims, the relevant facts of the case 
are as follows: 
1. At about 5:20 p.m. on May 11, 1994, Mr. Martinez left his Tooele home in his 
pickup to go to work. (R. 146, 199). 
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2. Mr. Martinez had to drive about an hour and one-half, and approximately 85 
miles east, to get to his work at the USPCI plant at Clive, Utah. (R. 146, 199). 
3. At about 7:00 p.m. on May 11, 1994, USPCI's security guards, Ted 
Housekeeper, and Eddie Hendrix, observed Mr. Martinez drive his pickup slowly, park in the 
parking lot, walk to the security office in an uncoordinated manner, and sign a log in the 
lobby. (R. 199, 259-60, 299-300). 
4. Because of Mr. Martinez' slurred speech and problem signing the log, Mr. 
Housekeeper declined to issue any safety equipment which Mr. Martinez needed in order to 
enter the plant and commence work. (R. 198, 298-99). 
5. Mr. Housekeeper requested that Mr. Martinez wait in the entry area for 
"Resource" (a supervisor) from USPCI to come. (R. 198, 298). 
6. Mr. Housekeeper paged for USPCI night supervisor Richard Brown to come 
to the security office. (R. 198, 293, 298). 
7. Thereafter, Mr. Housekeeper observed that Mr. Martinez had gone to the 
restroom in the waiting area, where Mr. Housekeeper heard Mr. Martinez vomiting. (R. 198, 
298). 
8. A few minutes later, Mr. Martinez was observed drinking some water in the 
security area and asking where Resource was. (R. 198, 295-96). 
9. At that time, Mr. Martinez advised Mr. Housekeeper: "I don't blame you. 
You're just doing your job." (R. 198, 295). 
10. Mr. Hendrix observed Mr. Martinez going into the bathroom. (R. 198, 254-55, 
295). 
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11. Mr. Hendrix then went outside to monitor vehicle traffic through the gate. (R. 
198, 254-56). 
12. While Mr. Housekeeper was on the phone, and while Mr. Hendrix was at the 
gate, Mr. Housekeeper observed Mr. Martinez entering his pickup truck, which was located 
in the parking lot some distance from and outside of the gate, and drive away speedily. (R. 
198, 253-56, 294-95). 
13. At approximately 8:10 p.m., Mr. Martinez drove his pickup truck on a public 
highway about sixty miles east of the USPCI plant, and just west of Grantsville, into a motor 
vehicle operated by Mr. McNicol. Mr. McNicol and Mr. Martinez were both killed and Mrs. 
McNicol was injured in the collision. (R. 192, 198). 
Response to Particular Statements in McNicoPs Brief 
Defendant USPCI has clarified a number of fact statements in plaintiffs brief in the 
above text. However, a few phrases in plaintiffs "statement of the case" warrant specific 
response. To the extent plaintiffs "Statement of the Case" is intended to be a statement of 
undisputed facts, USPCI disagrees with plaintiffs statement that Mr. Martinez was "detained 
by security guards" and that Mr. Martinez was "taken by the guards to a room to be held." 
Defendant USPCI further disagrees with plaintiffs statement that a security guard failed to 
alert the gate and that USPCI permitted Mr. Martinez to leave; which incorrectly infers that 
Mr. Martinez passed through some sort of security gate in his car and that USPCI could have 
stopped the vehicle. Plaintiff does not cite to the record in support of these characterizations 
in her "statement of the case." Moreover, plaintiffs cites to certain deposition excerpts (in 
her argument section) do not support these assertions. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Generally, a party does not have an affirmative duty to control the actions of a third 
person. It is undisputed that the plaintiff was not acting in the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of the accident in question and therefore no vicarious liability may 
be imposed upon defendant USPCI. The accident occurred sixty miles away from USPCI's 
facility and did not involve the use of a USPCI vehicle. There is no special relationship 
based on Mr. Martinez' employee status which would impose a duty on USPCI to restrain, 
or otherwise prevent Mr. Martinez from leaving USPCI's premises. USPCI's actions in 
dealing with Mr. Martinez did not create a duty to restrain or otherwise prevent Mr. Martinez 
from leaving USPCI's premises. Any holding that USPCI had a duty to restrain Mr. Martinez 
under these circumstances would be an unwarranted expansion of traditional employer liability 
law and would create a series of dilemmas to employers. 
Any duty of USPCI to use reasonable care under the circumstances was not breached 
by USPCI. 
A jury could only speculate that any of USPCI's alleged acts or omissions were a 
proximate cause of the accident. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. USPCI HAD NO DUTY TO RESTRAIN MR. MARTINEZ, OR 
OTHERWISE PREVENT HIM FROM LEAVING USPCFS 
PREMISES. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's decision granting summary judgment to 
defendant USPCI because USPCI did not have a duty, or even the right, to prevent Martinez 
from leaving. Ordinarily, a party does not have an affirmative duty to care for another. E.g. 
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986). Moreover, "one has no duty 
to look after the safety of another who has become voluntarily intoxicated and thus limited 
his ability to protect himself." Id (quoting Benallv v. Robinson. 14 Utah 2d 6, 9, 376 P.2d 
388, 390 (1962)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it will only impose a duty to control the actions 
of third parties under very limited circumstances. A plaintiff must prove that a special 
relationship exists which imposes an affirmative duty to control the conduct of third persons. 
E.g. Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991). The Court has acknowledged the 
"general applicability in Utah" of the special relation analysis described in Sections 314 
through 320 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1159. The 
Restatement sets forth the general tort principle that one has no duty to control the conduct 
of third persons. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965). 
In the case at hand, the only exceptions to the general rule that there is no duty to 
protect against the acts of third parties which could conceivably apply to the case at hand are 
the employee/employer exception found in Section 317 and the "taking charge" exception 
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found in Section 319. The Utah Supreme Court stated that it does not view these categories 
broadly. Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 236-37 (Utah 1993). 
The Court has taken a "policy based approach" in determining whether a special 
relationship is said to exist, and consequently whether a duty is owed. Id at 236. Moreover, 
the Court carefully considers the consequences of imposing that duty for the parties and for 
society. Id at 237. Consequently, the Court determines the existence of a duty by examining 
"such factors as the identity and character of the actor, victim, and the victimizer, the 
relationship of the actor to the victim and the victimizer, and the practical impact that finding 
a special relationship would have." Id 
A. USPCI's status as Martinez' employer did not create a duty to 
McNicol. 
Plaintiff does not claim that Mr. Martinez was in the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of the accident. Therefore, even assuming Martinez was in the 
course and scope of his employment before he left the premises, USPCI is not liable for Mr. 
Martinez' actions after he left the premises. Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 801 
P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1989) ("[Generally an employee is not in the scope of his employment 
for purposes of third-party negligence claims when he is traveling to and from work."). 
While it is true that courts have, in very limited circumstances, imposed liability on 
an employer for the actions of an employee which occurred while the employee was outside 
the scope of his employment, there is absolutely no question that this is not a viable theory 
in this case. Restatement Section 317 provides, in relevant part: 
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant 
while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from 
intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an 
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unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if (a) the servant (i) is upon the 
premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is privileged to 
enter only as his servant, or (ii) is using a chattel of the master . . . . 
Restatement (Second) Torts § 317 (1965). It is undisputed that Mr. Martinez was not on 
USPCI's premises at the time of the accident and was not driving a vehicle owned by USPCI 
at the time of the accident. (R. 7, 192, 198). The Utah Supreme Court has refused to hold 
employers liable under these circumstances. Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 935 (citations omitted). 
Moreover, courts from other states which have addressed facts similar to the case at 
hand have routinely applied this rule to prevent plaintiffs from recovering against a drunk 
driver's employer. Rg, Tallariti v. Kildare, 820 P.2d 952, 953 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) 
(finding no duty where intoxicated employee left work and was miles away from job site at 
time of accident); Purslev v. Ford Motor Co., 462 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) 
(same). 
B. USPCI's actions in dealing with Martinez did not create a duty 
to McNicol. 
Plaintiff argues that USPCI took actions which required it to prevent Martinez from 
leaving the USPCI facility. However, USPCI did not take custody of Mr. Martinez or 
otherwise assume the responsibility to prevent him from leaving the premises. 
In Christensen v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984), deputies responded to a call 
from a billiard hall reporting that a drunk was creating a disturbance. The deputies 
approached the man, who had been drinking, and requested that he walk his motorcycle from 
the location. The man did as he was told, but was killed a few minutes later trying to make 
a turn while driving the motorcycle. The complaint, filed by the personal representative of 
decedent, alleged that the police had reason to believe that the decedent was drunk and should 
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have arrested him. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint and the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision. 
In Christensen, the Court acknowledged that the deputies had a general duty to the 
public but did not hold the deputies liable for failing to arrest the decedent. The case at hand 
is less compelling than Christensen because USPCI did not owe a (statutory) general duty to 
the public. Moreover, the Court indicated that a private citizen does not have a duty to arrest 
- which is essentially what plaintiff is arguing. The fact that USPCI requested that Mr. 
Martinez not enter his work station does not somehow create a duty to arrest Mr. Martinez 
or to prevent him from leaving the premises, particularly where Mr. Martinez was cooperating 
with security personnel. 
In Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986), a case discussed in 
appellant's brief, a University of Utah student became disoriented after drinking alcohol and 
subsequently suffered severe injuries when she fell off a cliff. Despite the fact that this was 
a University sponsored trip, the plaintiff had a drinking-related incident on a previous trip, 
the supervisor knew that most of the people were drinking that night, and the supervisor 
himself had several beers, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision granting 
summary judgment to the defendants. The court held that "[a] realistic assessment of the 
nature of the relationship between the parties here precludes our finding that a special 
relationship existed between the University and Beach or other adult students." Id. at 419. 
The Court also stated: 
Had she not been a college student, but an employee in industry, she could not 
argue realistically that her employer would be responsible for compensating her 
for injuries incurred by her voluntary intoxication if she violated state liquor 
laws during her off hours while traveling on company business. 
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Id at 418 (emphasis added). 
Section 319 of the Restatement provides that: 
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be 
likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing 
such harm. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965). The comment and illustrations to that section 
address only situations where a dangerous person is in the custody of a hospital or sanitarium 
due to a contagious disease or a mental illness manifested by violence. Pursley, 462 N.E.2d 
at 250. In this case USPCI is not akin to a hospital or sanitarium which, under many 
circumstances, may have a duty to physically confine persons and prevent them from leaving. 
Plaintiff refers to Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993). Higgins 
and other similar Utah cases, like the illustrations from the Restatement, involve situations 
where the wrongdoer has either been arrested by police, imprisoned or committed. Higgins 
dealt with a patient who had previously been committed and confined. 
The Higgins Court stated that it would narrowly construe the Restatement sections that 
impose special duties. Higgins 855 P.2d at 237. Conversely, plaintiff would have this Court 
expand the purview of Section 319 so that employers dealing with a sick or intoxicated 
employee are in the same position, for purposes of liability, as a prison or mental hospital. 
Even the cases cited by plaintiff in her brief support a much narrower interpretation of the 
duty to control. Benallv v. Robinson, 376 P.2d 388, 389-90 (Utah 1962) (imposing duty on 
police officer only after plaintiff was in custody and after police officer exercised physical 
control over plaintiff by putting his hands on him). 
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Courts faced with facts similar to the case at hand have consistently refused to find a 
duty on the part of defendant employers to take measures to protect the public at large from 
the off duty torts of their employees. Kg, Williams v. USF&G, 854 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 
1988) ("[A]n employer should not be held liable for failing to prevent an employee from . 
. . departing from work in an automobile.11). In Cowin v. Huntington Hospital 496 N.Y.S.2d 
203 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), the defendant's employee reported for work in an intoxicated 
condition and the employer, although aware that the employee was driving a car, sent the 
employee home. IcL at 204. The employee later caused a car accident which injured the 
plaintiff. The court refused to hold the employer liable based on the employer/employee 
relationship, holding that driving to and from work is not within the scope of employment. 
Id 
The court also noted that the employee's actions in becoming intoxicated prior to 
coming to work could in no way be viewed as being performed in furtherance of the 
employer's requirements and that the employer did not participate in creating this condition. 
In reference to plaintiffs argument that Restatement Section 319 imposed a duty, the court 
held that "'taking charge' within the meaning of Section 319 requires a custodial relationship, 
one in which the person charged with controlling the conduct of another voluntarily assumes 
responsibility for that person." IdL at 205. The facts of the case at hand are even less 
compelling than those in Cowin. In both cases the employee showed up to work in an 
inebriated condition. However, in Cowin the employer knew the employee was drunk and 
instructed him to leave, knowing that the employee had driven an automobile to work. In the 
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case at hand, USPCI merely requested that Mr. Martinez not proceed to his work station, 
which request was respected by Mr. Martinez. 
In D-Amico v. Christie, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. 1987), an employer became aware that 
an employee was inebriated and then fired the employee and ordered him off the work site. 
Plaintiff was injured in a car accident with the inebriated employee. The court rejected 
plaintiffs employer/employee liability theories on the basis that the injuries clearly occurred 
outside the scope of employment. Id at 6-7. The court also rejected plaintiffs Restatement 
Section 319 theory, noting that fl[t]he Restatement illustrations themselves — relating to 
hospitals caring for contagious or violent patients — suggest a relationship more closely akin 
to custody, as that section has, in fact, been applied by the lower courts." Id at 7. 
In Tallariti v. Kildare, 820 P.2d 952 (Wash. App. 1991), employees of a subcontractor 
on a construction site bought two kegs of beer after completing their work for the day and 
then consumed the beer on the job site. One of the employees, who consumed eight cups of 
beer, left the construction site in his truck and caused an accident with a vehicle driven by 
the plaintiff. As in the case at hand, the accident occurred miles away from the job site. The 
court held that "unless the employee is using a chattel of the master, an employer has a duty 
to protect third persons only from acts of an employee that are committed while the employee 
is on the employer's premises." Id at 955 (emphasis in original) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 317(a)). 
As in the case at hand, the plaintiff in Tallariti argued that it was defendant's failure 
to control their employees on the job site that caused the injuries. Id Moreover, plaintiff 
argued that OSHA regulations precluded employees from drinking alcohol on the job site. 
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Nevertheless, the court held that the accident occurred miles away from the job site and thus 
the employer owed no duty to the plaintiff. Moreover, the court stated that the OSHA 
regulations were intended to protect the employees — not the plaintiff who was a member of 
the public driving an automobile on the highway. The court added, "courts have been loath 
to impose a duty upon third persons for injuries caused by another's intoxication." Id. 
Any ruling in favor of the plaintiff in this case would have far reaching and 
undesirable policy implications. The Utah Supreme Court has held that it will take a policy 
based approach in determining whether a duty is owed. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 236. This 
Court has held that it is "loath to recognize a duty that is realistically incapable of 
performance or fundamentally at odds with the nature of the parties' relationship." Id. at 237. 
In addition to the factors discussed supra (i.e. the relationships between the actor, the victim, 
and the victimizer), the Court will look at "the practical impact that finding a special 
relationship would have." Id. 
The practical impact of holding that USPCI owes a duty to plaintiff in this case would 
be to seriously expand traditional principles of employer liability in the State of Utah. It is 
undisputed that Mr. Martinez drank alcohol prior to his arrival at USPCI and that he was not 
provided with any alcohol while at USPCL Under these circumstances, a tavern owner would 
not be liable to plaintiff under Utah Dram Shop law. See Utah Code Ann. § 32A-l4-101 
(1990) (limiting dram shop liability to those who give, sell, or provide liquor, or allow 
consumption on the premises). In other words, if a person became drunk and afterwards 
visited a tavern (but was not allowed to drink at the tavern), the tavern owner would not be 
liable for preventing the patron from leaving. There are no persuasive arguments "why the 
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duty owed by one who does not furnish alcohol should be greater than the duty owed by one 
who does furnish it" Tallaritt 820 P.2d at 459. 
Furthermore, if the Court holds that USPCI had a duty to plaintiff in this case, a host 
of perplexing problems arise for employers in the State of Utah. For example, assume an 
employee has complained to her employer that she is having health problems and the 
employer directs or gives her permission to leave to see a doctor. If the employee is stricken 
(due to illness) on the way to the doctor's office and as a result injures someone in a car 
accident, is the employer now liable to the injured person on the theory that the employer 
took charge or controlled the employee? Even if the employer had a duty to care for its 
employee and to provide or allow for medical attention while on the job, can it really be 
argued that the employer has a duty (let alone the right) to physically restrain the employee 
or prevent her from leaving? 
Suppose the employee tells the employer that she needs to go home immediately to 
take some heart medication. Assume that the employer is concerned with liability 
implications of allowing the employee to leave and so the employer demands and/or forces 
the employee to remain at the facility. If medical help is slow in arriving, or if the 
ambulance or doctor is delayed, and the employee is stricken or dies, has not the employer 
exposed itself to a lawsuit for failure to allow the employee to leave and go take her 
medicine? Furthermore, if an employer physically prevents an employee from leaving (i.e. 
suspecting that the employee is intoxicated or under the influence of some drug), has not the 
employer now set itself up for false imprisonment or other similar claims? 
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The Utah Supreme court has refused to put employers in this kind of a position. In 
State v. Ludlow, 503 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1972), an employer refused to bring a female 
employee out of the factory so that a deputy sheriff could serve her with a small claims court 
order. It was undisputed that the employer had no objection to the service during work 
breaks but that he objected to service being done during working hours because his 
manufacturing process was dangerous if work was impeded. The Court refused to compel 
the employer to "produce" his employee under the self-determined approach chosen by the 
process server. The Court held that "such a rule might subject an employer to a false arrest 
confrontation if he dragged his employee through an assemblage of co-workers into the front 
office to face not only a lawman's badge but humiliation arising by innuendo incident thereto 
pointing to some kind of wrong-doing." Id at 1211. Similarly, this Court should decline to 
impose a duty on employers to physically restrain, or otherwise prevent their employees from 
leaving work - a duty which would be fundamentally at odds with the employer/employee 
relationship. 
H. USPCI DID NOT BREACH ANY DUTY TO THE MCNICOLS 
Even if USPCI did somehow owe a duty to restrain or otherwise prevent Mr. Martinez 
from leaving USPCI's premises, plaintiff has made no showing that USPCI's actions were 
unreasonable. 
In Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982), the defendant bowling alley was 
sued for failure to protect a patron from the allegedly foreseeable assault of another patron. 
Evidence was presented at trial that the bowling alley knew that tensions existed between 
plaintiffs bowling group and the assaulting patron's bowling group. Moreover, plaintiff had 
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complained of the other bowling group's unruly behavior just prior to the assault. However, 
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision granting judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict in favor of the defendant bowling alley. The Court held that "[i]t required 
unreasonable speculation by the jury to conclude from a generalized animosity between two 
leagues that [the bowling alley] should have had prescience of the attack which resulted." Id. 
at 696. 
Similarly, in the case at hand, it would require unreasonable speculation by a jury to 
conclude that, because USPCI suspected Mr. Martinez was intoxicated, USPCI should have 
known Mr. Martinez would try and leave the facility. The evidence is that Mr. Martinez was 
cooperating with security personnel prior to leaving the premises. (R. 198, 295). 
Furthermore, when security personnel realized Mr. Martinez had left, Mr. Martinez was some 
distance away from them and was entering his car. (R. 198, 253-56, 294-95). Under these 
circumstances, the trial court correctly found that USPCI did not breach a duty to prevent Mr. 
Martinez from leaving USPCI's premises. 
III. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT USPCI'S ACTS WERE THE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
Even assuming that USPCI breached a duty to plaintiff, which USPCI strongly denies, 
there is no evidence in the record that any act of USPCI was a proximate cause of the 
accident. The plaintiff has the burden to show that USPCI's conduct was a substantial 
causative factor that led to Mr. McNicol's death and Mrs. McNicol's injuries. Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985). There is no evidence that the alleged acts 
or omissions of USPCI proximately caused the accident in question. 
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Mr. Martinez became intoxicated prior to arriving at USPCI and left USPCI of his own 
volition. Any argument that USPCI should have acted differently, and that had it acted 
differently the accident would not have occurred, is purely speculation. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that f,[w]hen the proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim 
fails as a matter of law." IcL (quoting Staheli v. Farmers Cooperative of Southern Utah* 655 
P.2d 680, 684 (Utah 1982). Plaintiff herself has never even offered a specific and practical 
proposal as to what an employer should do with an inebriated employee. Therefore, this 
Court should affirm the trial court's decision granting USPCFs motion for summary judgment 
for failure to produce sufficient evidence that USPCFs alleged acts and omissions were the 
proximate cause of the McNicols' injuries. 
CONCLUSION 
Existing case law and public policy concerns mandate that USPCI had no duty or right 
to restrain or otherwise prevent Mr. Martinez from leaving the premises on the day of the 
accident. Furthermore, there is no evidence that USPCI breached any duty to the McNicols 
or that the alleged acts and omissions of USPCI were the proximate cause of the McNicols' 
injuries. For the foregoing reasons, USPCI respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's decision granting summary judgment to USPCI. 
Dated this / ^ day of December, 1996. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Jay £/Jensen 
Geoffrey C. Haslam 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
USPCI 
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APPENDIX A: 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Jay E. Jensen, #1676 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant USPCI 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY MCNICOL, individually and ) 
as executor for the estate of ) 
JAMES MCNICOL, SR., ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
USPCI and RED'S LOUNGE, ) 
Defendants, ) 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i 
i 
Civil No. 940300040 WD 
Judge L.A. Dever 
The motion of the defendant USPCI for summary judgment on 
plaintiff's complaint came on regularly for hearing before the 
Honorable L.A. Dever in the above-entitled court on December 4, 1995 
at about 11:00 a.m. The parties through their respective counsel 
having submitted memoranda and having argued the matter fully, 
The Court finds, as a matter of law, that defendant USPCI 
did not have and did not breach any duty to restrain, prevent, retain 
or otherwise control the conduct of David W. Martinez and therefore 
grants defendant USPCI's motion for summary judgment and, 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff take nothing 
from defendant USPCI, that the action against defendant USPCI be 
dismissed on the merits, a.nH thnh fC-^fo n^ nf- n^ Pf=^ a^^ o^Ar^ -r ry£-j?Yi<* 
%m-2 F;; IH-S 
FILED GV. 
1 
of- iTamopi Mf?Nn <-n1
 ; —Sr. , i t s c o s t s - o f a o t i o n i n tha-fiiim of ^ 
DATED t h i s J— day of.Jfea?eh, 1996 . 
BY THE COURT: 
p o t a b l e L.A. Dever 
D i s t r i c t Cour t J u d g e 
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